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PENSIONS MIS-SELLING-THE LESSONS FOR
REGULATING PRIVATISED SOCIAL SECURITY*
Richard Noblest and Julia Black'
INTRODUCTION'
The introduction of regulation to the retail financial servic-
es sector of the United Kingdom coincided with the
government's decision to allow banks, insurance companies
and building societies to offer private alternatives to state
pensions ("personal pensions") direct to the general public. The
resulting situation, generally reported in the media as the
"Personal Pension mis-selling scandal," is a case study on both
the hazards of privatising Social Security and the conditions of
effective regulation. Retail regulation and the marketing of
personal pensions as alternatives to state and occupational
pensions both commenced in 1988. By 1992 it became apparent
that 91 percent2 of personal pensions sold to former members
of occupational pension schemes failed to comply with regula-
(© 1998 Richard Nobles and Julia Black. All Rights Reserved.
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tions. This has led to an enforced review of 2.4 million personal
pension sales with a view to identifying loss and offering com-
pensation. It is estimated that the costs of this review and
compensation will amount to anywhere between £2 and £11
billion.4
With many countries reviewing the affordability of their
Social Security arrangements (particularly, given demographic
considerations, the cost of state pensions), the U.K. pension
mis-selling scandal offers a case study to those seeking to con-
struct a regulatory system which can reduce, or re-distribute,
the losses to consumers which may otherwise follow from an
increased reliance on privatised forms of Social Security. In
particular, there are two debates on the effectiveness of regula-
tion that may be informed by the U.K. experience. First, the
choice between self-regulation and regulation by government
agency or department. Second, the relative advantages of gen-
eral rules and principles over more detailed and prescriptive
forms of regulation. These are, as we shall see, overlapping
choices and concerns.
I. STYLES OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: SELF-REGULATION VS.
REGULATION BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT
The introduction of regulation to the retail sector of the
financial services industry in 1988 was part of a general re-
form of financial regulation carried out in response to a num-
ber of financial scandals in the early 80's. The proper balance
between government regulation and self-regulation formed a
major part of the debate that preceded these reforms. In the
White Paper which preceded the introduction of the Financial
3 See HM TREASURY, PENSION MIS-SELLING, H.C. 1997/8 712-iii [ 13, 27
(Memorandum submitted House of Commons Treasury Select Comm.).
' The government's estimate for the cost of investigating and compensating
600,000 "priority" cases is £2 billion. There are another 1.8 million "non-priority"
cases. See id. The financial press have estimated the total cost of investigating
and compensating all mis-sold personal pensions at £11 billion. See Payment Row
Grows: The Pension Scandal, FIN. TIMES (London), July 4, 1998, available in
LEXIS, WORLD Library, FINTIME File.
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Services bill,5 the advantages of self-regulation were said to
be:
1. Best possibility of combining regulation with market
innovation.
2. More likely to be effective if there was significant practi-
tioner involvement in devising the rules and enforcing rules.
3. Greater flexibility as rule changes did not require Par-
lament.
4. Practitioners best equipped to spot breaches and take
swift and effective enforcement action.
5. Easier to prepare private regulation ahead of introduc-
tion.
6. Day to day regulatory action would be distanced from
government.
Although they often accompany arguments on self-regula-
tion, reasons three and five have little merit in a country
whose legislative processes are capable of exhibiting some
foresight and flexibility. However, the other considerations
assume that industry participants can be expected to show
greater expertise than civil servants in drafting and enforcing
investor protection measures. They are also expected to have a
greater ability to assess the trade-off between the benefits of
such protection and market innovation, a function of their
greater knowledge, and their insulation from political pres-
sures.6
Considerations of institutional design were associated with
styles of regulatory intervention. Government regulation was
associated with a detailed, prescriptive and interventionist
style.7 By contrast, self-regulation, whereby organisations par-
ticipated in rule creation and took an active role in rule en-
forcement, was expected to lead to a less detailed, more flexible
and informal form of investor protection.
5 FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR IN-
VESTOR PROTECTION, 1985, Cmnd. 9423, 1 5.14.
6 See Alan C. Page, Financial Services: The Self-Regulatory Alternative?, in
REGULATION AND PUBLIC LAW 298 (Robert Baldwin & Christopher McCrudden eds.,
1987).
' The Council for the Securities Industry argued that government regulations
would "inevitably tend towards over-detailed regulation and rigid interpretation of
rules." Id. at 306.
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Self-regulation can extend to internal regulation by the
firm of itself. Such forms of regulation are said to allow inspec-
tion to cover operations which could not expect to be moni-
tored, or at least not frequently, by government inspectors.
This aspect of self-regulation also gains when combined with
general rules. The general rules allow the firm's own regulato-
ry staff to calculate the implications of such rules in the specif-
ic circumstances facing the firm. Such staff may be better
qualified and will, in any case, have better knowledge of the
firm's environment. Self-regulation in this form allows inspec-
tion by government inspectors to take the form of checks on
the procedures adopted by the firm's compliance staff. Where
such self-regulation is required and undermined by statutory
provisions, it has been styled by Ayes & Braithwaite as "en-
forced self-regulation."'
II. RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION UNDER THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES ACT 1986
It is not our intention to become embroiled in a discussion
of whether the system of regulation introduced in 1988 was
truly "self' as opposed to "government" regulation. Rather, we
wish to consider whether those features of the system that
approximated to each of these models provided the benefits
claimed for the respective model. In particular, whether the
self-regulatory features of the system provided greater
protections against pension mis-selling than could have been
expected from a system which relied more on regulation by
government agency.
The Financial Services Act 1986 allowed the Secretary of
State to delegate the regulation of financial services to the
Securities and Investment Board ("SIB"). This body, a corpora-
tion rather than a government department, was expected to be
staffed by experts from within the industry. Alongside SIB, the
various sectors of the industry were allowed to set up their
own self-regulatory organisations ("SROs"). To be authorised to
carry out investment business, an individual or firm had to be
a member of an SRO or licensed and regulated directly by SIB.




SROs could legislate and enforce their own rules. However, as
their rules had to offer investor protection that was at least as
good as that provided by SIB's rules, they tended to mirror
SIB's own.9 The independence of the SROs was, therefore, fo-
cused at the level of enforcement. The most important of these
SROs for the control of retail financial services was LAUTRO
which regulated the insurance companies and FIMBRA which
regulated independent financial intermediaries.
SIB's expertise was less informed by industry experience
than one might have hoped. The initial rule draftsman, for
example, was an ex-Parliamentary counsel used to drafting
statutes. However, its board included experienced city practi-
tioners, and, thus, to the extent that the expertise which need-
ed to be supplied through self-regulation was that of senior
management, SIB should have provided the benefits of self-
regulation. The SROs followed this pattern. For example,
whilst the board of LAUTRO was made up from the senior
executives of insurance companies, its senior enforcement offi-
cer came from the Department of Trade and Industry. Given
the previously unregulated existence of the retail financial
sector, this pattern of recruitment was unsurprising. Until self-
regulation by firms led to the introduction of compliance offi-
cers, there could be no "poachers turned game-keepers" who
could provide regulatory agencies with enforcement expertise.
Nevertheless, the rules of SIB, LAUTRO and FIMBRA
that are relevant to the pension mis-selling scandal exhibit
many of the features associated with self-regulation. They were
general rather than specific. What they required in practice
was left to the firms to decide for themselves. The details of
these rules changed over the period in question," but, in es-
sence, required any person advising on or recommending an
investment product to obtain sufficient information from the
customer as to his/her financial circumstances (the "know your
customer" rule),1 to advise only on those products which were
suitable for the customer," to recommend only that product
' The SROs were required to have rules which were "equivalent" to SIB's
rules under the FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986 ("FSA7), sched. 2, 3.
'o See J. BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS (1997).
" SIB RULES 3.01 (1987); SIB PRINCIPLE 4.
12 See SIB RULES 5.01 (1987); SIB CORE RULE 16. LAUTRO and FIMBRA had
equivalent rules. The meaning of the suitability rule was the subject of a number
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on the product range which would best meet the customer's
needs ("best advice")," and a requirement for adequate re-
cords to be kept. 4
These duties, in particular that of suitability, have been
repeatedly emphasised by SIB to be key elements of the inves-
tor protection regime," but exactly what they require in any
particular circumstance has been a matter of considerable
debate. SIB has always maintained that the duty has a com-
parative aspect, and that inherent within the duty are two
principles: that the investment recommended "must not be one
which on any reasonable view the customer would be better off
without" and that an advisor should not recommend a product
when another type "would plainly be more appropriate."16
However, during the period in which most of the mis-selling oc-
curred, 1988-1992, there was no guidance from the regulators
as to exactly what the duties of know your customer and suit-
ability required in any particular case.
In a similar vein, the regulators gave no guidance on what
constituted "adequate records." Whilst the most common meth-
od of recording knowledge of customers was a standard "fact
find" which each salesman would be required to complete, the
length of such a document, or the information it was to record,
were not proscribed. Indeed, LAUTRO confirmed that there
was no requirement to use a fact find, merely noting that it
was a "popular solution for the know your customer and record
keeping requirements." 7
of discussion documents: COMMTITEE TO REVIEW THE MKTG. REGIME FOR RETAIL
PRODS. AND SERVS., REGULATION OF THE MARKETING OF INVESTMENT PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES (1990); SIB, REGULATION OF THE MARKETING OF INVESTMENT PROD-
UCTS AND SERVICES: A POLICY STATEMENT 18 (Mar. 1991) (SIB stated that it
agreed with the view that suitability has a comparative aspect, "so that invest-
ment recommendations should not be given without any regard to the merits (rela-
tive to the customer's needs) of alternative types of saving and investment vehi-
cles. SIB attaches great weight to the suitability requirement as a key component
of the investor protection regime.").
13 SIB RULE 5.07, 5.08 (1987); SIB CORE RULE 17. LAUTRO and FIMBRA
had equivalent rules.
4 See SIB PRINCIPLE 9.
15 See, e.g., SIB, REGULATION OF THE MARKETING OF INVESTMENT PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES, A POLICY STATEMENT (Mar. 1991); SIB, RETAIL REGULATION REVIEW
(Discussion Paper No. 2, 1991) [hereinafter DP2; REGULATION OF THE MARKETING
OF INVESTMENT SERVICES AND PRODUCTS: REPORT OF A REVIEW COMMITTEE (1990).
" DP 2, supra note 15, 26.
17 LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 3.02 (July 1988).
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III. THE MIS-SELLING SCANDAL
The "scandal" started with a statistical fact. In 1992, when
SIB looked at a sample of SRO members' pension sale files,
only 9 percent had records which demonstrated substantial
compliance with the know your customer and best advice
rules." SIB required the SROs to require their members to
conduct a review of their pension sales to see whether, in fact,
there had been a breach of these rules. In light of the difficul-
ties of recreating the circumstances of these sales, and the
circumstantial evidence that large numbers of such sales were
carried out in breach of these rules, most firms have simply
conceded non-compliance, and are seeking to establish loss
with a view to paying compensation.
The circumstantial evidence which makes non-compliance
likely also forms part of the scandal. There was a general fail-
ure on the part of salesmen, compliance officers, senior man-
agement and regulators to appreciate the complexities and
risks involved in selling personal pensions to members, or
persons eligible to be members, of their employer's occupation-
al pension scheme. Although this scandal has implications for
privatising Social Security, it should be pointed out that this is
not an example of individuals receiving less than their state
pension as a result of mis-selling. There is no suggestion that
the standards of advice and recordkeeping provided to those
who exchanged state pensions for personal pensions was any
better than for those who gave up occupational pensions.
Statistical surveys carried out by SIB established that the level
of government subsidy provided to personal pensions had been
so generous that few of those who would otherwise have relied
solely on the state pension were made worse off by changing to
a personal pension. 9 However, for those who were, or were
eligible to be, members of occupational pensions, the position
was very different.
Comparing the benefits of occupational and personal pen-
sion schemes is made complex by the fact that they offer very
different forms of benefit. Personal pensions are defined contri-
bution schemes. The scheme is simply a tax efficient savings
18 See supra note 2.
19 See SIB, PRESS RELEASE (Mar. 1996).
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vehicle whereby the accumulated savings of the individual are
used to purchase an annuity at retirement. By contrast, the
bulk of occupational pension members belong to defined benefit
schemes. The benefits, which are secured by a ftnd, are calcu-
lated by reference to the member's salary at the date of leaving
the scheme. The risk that the fund will not prove sufficient to
pay the benefits is born by the employer, who must make addi-
tional payments if the scheme becomes insolvent. A typical
scheme pays 1/60th of a member's final salary for each year of
membership. Occupational schemes also typically offer death in
service benefits (a form of life insurance) and ill health benefits
(a form of disability insurance). Moreover, occupational
schemes typically provide benefits to spouses and dependents
on a non-negotiable basis, whilst in personal pensions these
are often optional extras.
These differences make it difficult for any salesman to give
"best advice" to an occupational scheme member intending to
take out a personal pension instead of continuing to belong to
their employer's scheme. However, alongside these complexi-
ties, there is a stark and, on the part of the industry and regu-
lators, overlooked fact. For any person who is currently eligible
to belong to an occupational pension scheme, and who expects
to stay in that scheme for more than two years, a personal
pension is unlikely to provide better value. Employers contrib-
ute to their occupational pension schemes, and their contribu-
tions are, in the long term, typically at least as much as those
made by the employees. The employers' contributions are nec-
essary because the value of occupational scheme benefits is
greater than could be afforded by the members' contributions
alone. Employers are not required to make any equivalent con-
tribution to the personal pensions of employees who leave the
occupational scheme in order to take out a personal pension
(opt-outs) or fail to join the occupational scheme having taken
out a personal pension (non-joiners). Thus, scheme members
who decide to pay their contributions to a personal pension
scheme instead of their employer's scheme simply forego the
extra value represented by their employer's contributions. To
put this in colloquial terms, this is simply not a level playing
field. Except for those members who leave an occupational
scheme within two years (who only get a return of their own
contributions plus interest), the lack of a contribution from the
[Vol. 64: 3
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employer means that there is little likelihood of a personal
pension proving to be a better investment than an occupational
scheme. Following their report on poor record keeping, SIB
commissioned further research to find out what proportion of
personal pensions had been sold to persons who were, or were
eligible to be, members of an occupational pension scheme.
This research revealed that 22 percent of all sales had been to
such persons.2" With the evidence provided by these two sur-
veys, it was generally accepted, especially within the media,
that there had been a widespread breach of the "best advice"
and "know your customer rules." The focus of attention be-
came: what had firms, and regulators, done to prevent the mis-
selling of personal pensions? The answer to this question rep-
resents a major regulatory failure, by both firms and regula-
tors.
A. Regulatory Failure Within Firms
1. Management Supervision and Training
The complexities of selling personal pensions were not
something that the industry took on board from 1988 until
1992. The main focus of firms was in securing their future
against a background of significant restructuring as banks,
building societies and life companies competed for the same
markets. Competition took the form of a battle for distribution
outlets. Life companies moved to set up or expand direct sales
forces and to ensure that as many brokers as possible sold the
company's products. In such a battle, both the management
supervision and the training of advisors suffered. Both the
direct sales forces and appointed representatives (formally
independent individuals or firms who sold only the products of
the product provider) were frequently recruited without ade-
quate checks.2 As one senior sales director admitted: "we
20 See SIB, PENSIONS OPT OUTS (Oct. 1994)
2" At the end of its first full cycle of enforcement visits in 1993, LAUTRO's
monitoring committee reported that 22% of firms and 35% of life offices had ex-
hibited "serious compliance shortcomings." The principal failures which were found
were in recruitment processes for sale agents, both direct sales forces and appoint-
ed representatives, including failure to check references or indebtedness to previ-
ous firms; poor recordkeeping including non-completion of fact finds; failure to
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were looking for people capable of producing a reasonable level
of business, and quality came second." The lack of controls over
appointed representatives ("ARs") in particular became a mat-
ter of increasing regulatory concern.22 Although the principal
firm was meant to take responsibility for ensuring the compe-
tence of its ARs and their compliance with the regulatory re-
quirements," frequently that supervision did not occur.24
2. Management Supervision Over the Direct Sales Force
was Often Also Weak
Monitoring systems, for example, giving area sales manag-
ers responsibility to check fact finds, were designed on the as-
sumption that the sales managers would then use these finds
as part of the ongoing training or improvement of standards;
any failings in these were then not examined in depth and
explanations often easily accepted. As another senior sales
director explained: "a lot of things we did not investigate be-
cause we trusted the salesmen and the sales managers and the
supervise and adequately control the direct and/or appointed representative sales
force; and failings in the training and competence systems. See LAUTRO, EN-
FORCEMENT BULL. 25, 91 2.05, 3.03 (Oct. 1993).
22 See LAUTRO, LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 25, 3.03 (Oct. 1993);
LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 14, 2.06-.07 (Feb. 1992); ENFORCEMENT BULL. 5,
§ 1 (Oct. 1989); see also KIT JEBENS, LAUTRO: A PIONEER REGULATOR 55, 77-99
(Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales ("ICAEW"), 1996). For
this reason, those with extensive AR networks were seen as priorities for early
periodic inspection visits, see LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 14, 1 2.01-.02 (Feb.
1992), and LAUTRO introduced rule changes concerning the member firm's respon-
sibility for ARs and a separate register of ARs to parallel that for company repre-
sentatives. See LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 31 (Mar. 1990).
' Under section 44 of the FSA, a person could be the AR of an authorised
firm, without themselves having to be authorised. Initially introduced as a mecha-
nism to cover self-employed salesmen who sold only the products of one firm (e.g.,
the sales forces of Allied Dunbar, Abbey Life) and avoid the need for each one of
them to seek authorisation, it became a vehicle by which firms of any size could
tie themselves to a product provider, and so avoid the costs of authorisation and
compliance. The principal firm was under an obligation to ensure that the firm
complied with the rules. The regulator had no direct relationship with the AR; it
could only act against the AR through the member.
24 "[R]ules concerning the member's responsibilities towards its ARs" were being
"misread, ignored and even flouted." JEBENS, supra note 22, at 55. Kit Jebens was
chief executive of LAUTRO from 1989-1996.
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last thing that you wanted to do was to put that trust at
risk .... After 1993 we were much more forceful and distrust-
ing than before."'
The generally low levels of training and competence of
sales agents of all types compounded the lack of management
control and supervision. LAUTRO's rules in 1988 required a
member not to appoint a person as a company representative
unless they had the "requisite aptitude and competence,"26
but did not elaborate. In practice, the provision addressing
training for direct sales forces and ARs varied considerably,
ranging from a two week initial training course, plus private
study and three to six months of ongoing training, to two hours
for an appointed representative." The average amount of
training time an agent of a direct sales force had before meet-
ing a customer in a supervised interview was seven and a half
days; the average time before going out alone was thirteen
days, and some did not have supervised visits at all.2"
Pension's training took the same form as training on the
firm's other products: advisors were meant to know the techni-
cal aspects of the firm's in-house pension products. Lack of
training on occupational pension schemes meant that salesmen
had neither an awareness of the need to make detailed com-
parisons nor an understanding that would enable them to do
SO.
3. Commission
Finally, the structure of pay and incentives within firms
operated in tension with compliance with the best advice and
suitability rules. Compliance with these rules could in some
cases mean no sale: the product that the adviser could sell was
' Some of the failings in management supervision did lead to disciplinary
action. In 1992, LAUTRO sought the voluntary cessation of sales by the sales
forces of three life companies and formally suspended that of another. In one of
its more high-profile enforcement actions in March 1994, LAUTRO suspended
Norwich Union's 600 strong direct sales force. In June 1994 SIB publicly rebuked
Barclays Life, and Nationwide-at the time the appointed representative of GRE-
suspended its sales force in agreement with LAUTRO.
26 LAUTRO RULE 3.5 (1987 as amended).
27 See 0. MCDONALD, REPORT ON TRAINING AND COMPETENCE IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY 3.4.1-.2 (SIB, May 1990).
28 See Training for Gain, MONEY MGMT., Aug. 1991, at 26-32.
19981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
simply not suitable for the investor. However, promotion and
pay of both advisers and their line managers were sales driv-
en, with most advisers being paid on a commission-only basis.
The structure of pay and incentives that existed within firms
effectively negated any exhortations that were being made by
senior management for compliance.
B. Compliance Officers
The FSA regulatory system envisaged that firms would
take responsibility for ensuring their own compliance through
employing a particular officer assigned to that particular
task.29 However, it appears that compliance systems within
firms at the time were, on the whole, inadequate. The reports
of LAUTRO's monitoring committee indicate a significant de-
gree of non-compliance with LAUTRO rules throughout the
period. At the end of its first round of periodic inspection visits
("PIVs") the monitoring team reported that 22 percent of all
members, and 35 percent of life offices, visited over the full
course of the three-year inspection cycle exhibited "serious
compliance shortcomings necessitating requests for extensive
remedial action."0 After the first year of the second cycle of
visits, 13 to 16 percent were still exhibiting serious compliance
shortcomings.3' Five of the eleven firms disciplined in 1992/3
were found to have "deep rooted and systemic shortcomings in
their compliance arrangements";32 and eight of the thirteen
firms disciplined in 1993/4 were disciplined for the same rea-
son.
The compliance officers we interviewed, when asked what
the compliance system was like in the early years of regula-
tion, commented variously that it was weak, unsatisfactory,
disorganized, chaotic, or under-resourced. Compliance was also
a new role, implementing new regulation. As one officer com-
mented: "I'm sure [others] will have spoken to you about com-
pliance officers feeling beleaguered, and it was true. It was a
new role, a new domain, so the people put into it had no
29 Required by SROs individually, and from 1991, by SIB Principle 9.
31 LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BuLL. 25, [ 2.01, 2.04 (Oct. 1993).
3 See id. 91 2.05.
32 Id. %1 4.01. The firms were found to have breached SIB Principle 9, which
requires companies to have adequate compliance arrangements.
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benchmark of how to operate... ; they were making things up
as they went along." Moreover, there appears to have been
little commitment by firms to compliance as a strategic part of
the business as a whole. As LAUTRO noted:
[T]he Compliance department could sometimes be seen as the none-
too-demanding last resting-place for long serving staff on the verge
of retirement. In other cases, the post of Compliance Officer was
given low seniority in the company hierarchy, and/or filled by staff
with little natural authority. Consequently, the clout of Compliance
was limited in some organizations, a situation not eased by the lack
of interest sometimes displayed by senior management who believed
they had "done compliance" by setting up the department.'
Firms generally sought to comply with the requirement to
"know your customer" and keep "adequate records" through
fact finds: questionnaire sheets which advisors had to com-
plete. However, the length and depth of fact finds required by
compliance officers varied enormously both between firms and
within firms over time: the shortest reported was one sheet of
A4, the longest thirty-three pages. Fact finds were often either
simply filed away or just checked mechanically for completion
of data. There was little or no qualitative assessment of how
that information was being interpreted or what recommenda-
tions had been made. However, even if monitoring of fact finds
had been more systematic and vigorous, they would not have
prevented pension mis-selling as compliance officers had little
understanding of the nature of occupational pension scheme
benefits, or the need to compare the benefits of such schemes
with the personal pension before selling the latter to a person
who was, or was eligible to be, a member of an occupational
pension scheme.
C. Regulatory Failure by the Regulators
The charge which firms levy at the regulators is that the
latter gave them no guidance (at least until 1992) as to what
type of information was required to be sought, and what sorts
of information had to be obtained, in order to comply with the
"know your customer" and "best advice" rules when selling
personal pensions. In its first enforcement bulletin, LAUTRO
LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 33, xiv (Nov. 1994).
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had washed its hands of this responsibility in connection with
any investment products: "Members are requested to ensure
that their representatives understand that the design of a "fact
find" and its manner of use is a company or society matter."34
It was not until 1992 that guidance was given as to what
the suitability and know your customer duties actually en-
tailed with respect to pensions business. In February 1992
LAUTRO issued an enforcement bulletin35 which noted the
incidence of "large scale advice" to investors to transfer out of
occupational pension schemes 36 and a high incidence of com-
plaints about personal pension business.37 The bulletin
warned that sales advisors were failing to make sufficiently
detailed, realistic or objective analysis of the relative merits of
occupational and personal pensions, failures that were arising
for a number of reasons. These included lack of training, a
deliberate ignoring of suitability requirements, and inadequate
monitoring of fact finds by members. In July 1992 LAUTRO
and FIMBRA issued guidance which specifically stated that
advising someone to opt out of a defined benefits occupational
scheme whilst they were still in the same employment would
not, prima facie, constitute best advice; the onus would be on
the representative to show that opting out was in the
investor's interests. 8 With respect to opt outs, information
about the occupational scheme and the rights and benefits
available under it was required, obtainable from the scheme
booklet.
The publication of the guidance marked a significant
awakening by LAUTRO to the nature of the issues involved in
advising on pensions, demonstrating a far greater knowledge
and awareness of the particular nature of pensions business
than had been shown hitherto. Its publication prompts two
questions: did the 1992 guidance mark a change in standards
3' LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 3.02 (July, 1988).
3' LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 14, (Feb. 1992).
"' See id. 3.08.
31 See id. if 6.06-.10.
38 See FIMBRA, GUIDANCE NOTE NO. 7 (1992); LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL.
16, 1.05 (July 1992). SIB issued the same guidance in September 1992 and
IMRO in March 1993.
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or simply a further specification of them, and what were the
regulators doing in their enforcement processes that problems
with pensions selling were not picked up on earlier?
1. Change in Standards?
With respect to the first question, the regulators, of course,
maintain that the guidance, and indeed the criteria being used
in the review, did not mark a change in standards: the know
your customer and suitability requirements had always been
there. The general meaning of the suitability rule (although
not its application in the case of pensions) had indeed formed
an important part of the review of retail regulation that oc-
curred between 1990 and 1991, and the comparative aspect of
the duty had been emphasized." So specification yes, but
change, no. Firms, on the other hand, argue that specification
equaled change and that regulators had not told them what
the general rules required in this particular instance. The
regulators' response: you should not need to be told. Thus, the
charge that rules were applied retrospectively is complicated to
make out, for at its root it assumes a particular distribution of
responsibility between regulator and regulatee to determine
what conduct is required or barred in particular circumstances.
In this particular instance, the issue is essentially not the
imposition of a new standard by the regulator but the thinking
through of what an existing, but broadly framed, standard
could require in particular circumstances. For firms to argue
that the imposition of the results of that "thinking through"
process is retrospective is effectively for them to argue that it
is not their responsibility to go through such a thought process
themselves: the regulator should tell them exactly what is
required, and, moreover, tell them at the time of doing the
business, not after the event. Whether or not it is their respon-
sibility, or should be, is a matter to which we will return be-
low.
" See DP 2, supra note 15, 26.
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2. Pensions and Enforcement
With respect to the second question of what the regulators
were doing in their monitoring activities prior to 1992, the
short answer is that no one was looking at pensions, or, in-
deed, at the sale or marketing of any product in particular.
Rather, the monitoring processes of SIB, FIMBRA and
LAUTRO looked at the whole of a firm's business across the
spectrum of its regulated activities, and further monitoring
tended to be firm focused and firm specific. It took a significant
period of time to accumulate information about a number of
firms, and then the processes for standing back and taking a
cross-industry approach to anything but the most blatant activ-
ities were limited.
Moreover, the monitoring processes of the regulators dif-
fered. FIMBRA had by far the largest membership in terms of
numbers but suffered acute financial difficulties. 0 For the
first three years, it used three of the major accounting firms to
do its monitoring, much of which was based on annual ac-
counts and self-certifications submitted by the firms. Its prima-
ry concern, however, was fraud and secondarily churning or
other sharp practices: the issue of whether the right product
had been chosen in any particular situation was well down the
list of priorities.4 ' As one ex-FIMBRA official commented:
FIMBRA spent its first five years running out all the crooks and
incompetents, [the question was] "where has all the money gone?" It
was not about standards of conduct of business, the starting point
was, are people fit and proper? It's no good looking now and saying,
well why didn't you find this out in your monitoring visits ... , we
were in a different game then.
Thus, even though the Council's attention had been alerted to
the potential for mis-selling by a Council member in 1991, it is
fairly clear why FIMBRA did not pick up on pensions mis-
'0 See FIMBRA, ANNUAL REPORTS 1987-1995.
41 The introduction of a pensions expert onto FIMBRA Council did raise
FIMBRA's awareness of the nature and potential problems of pensions business,
however, and in FIMBRA Briefing No. 6 in October 1991, it questioned the suit-
ability of advice being given by one IFA to a significant number of members of




selling in its enforcement activities: questions of suitability and
best advice were just too far down their list of enforcement
priorities.
LAUTRO had a far smaller number of members,42 and its
members also tended to be large firms with their own compli-
ance departments. LAUTRO's officers would monitor principal-
ly the activities not so much of the firm but of its own internal
monitors. After an initial round of advisory visits, it began
periodic inspection visits in 1990. These looked principally at
recruitment procedures, internal monitoring systems and fact
finds. Fact finds were checked principally for completion; there
was no suitability assessment, and beyond those instances
which were "obvious" (pensions were not in this category),
advice given was treated as an area where opinions might rea-
sonably differ. In its monitoring process as a whole, there was
no particular focus on the sale or marketing of any particular
product.
There were, nevertheless, a number of indications that all
was not well in the field of pensions advice to which LAUTRO
began to respond. It gave early warnings on the need to give
best advice in relation to some pension sales and advertise-
ments. 43At the end of 1990, action was taken against firms
who were targeting three public sector schemes-the police, the
miners' and the nurses.'" However, although there were early
indications of some problems, these were seen simply as just
another set to add to the list; pensions business was not partic-
ularly marked out as being problematic.
Towards the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, the accu-
mulated findings from inspection visits, the increased levels of
complaints from investors relating to personal pensions, and a
number of warnings beginning to be sounded by pension fund
trustees and specialist actuaries did prompt that some specific
attention be paid to pensions, at least at the level of guidance,
and in February LAUTRO issued its warning on pensions
business, noted above. Further specific guidance on pensions
business followed in June,45 echoed by FIMBRA,4" and in the
" See LAUTRO, ANNUAL REPORTS 1987-1995.
'3 See LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 7, 1 2.01-3 (Mar. 1990); LAUTRO, EN-
FORCEMENT BULL. 5, %% 2.01-3 (Oct. 1989); LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 91
3.09 (July 1988).
" Information provided to Authors by Kit Jebens in August 1997.
41 See LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 16 (June 1992).
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request for firms to review all opt out business concluded in
the last two years where the investor had terminated the con-
tract. Investors were to be contacted in order to determine
whether the sale was made on the basis of inappropriate ad-
vice. If it was, the firm was to handle the matter in the same
way as complaints.4 v
There appear to be several main reasons why pension mis-
selling was not picked up on earlier by LAUTRO. The first
relates to the novelty of the regulatory system and the lack of
experience that both regulators and firms had with regard to
regulation. As an organization, LAUTRO had little experience
as to what standards should be required or how they should be
imposed. LAUTRO officials did not, on the whole, have an in-
dustry background; their initial round of "advisory visits" was
intended as much to educate themselves about the industry as
they were to introduce the industry to regulation. They also
had little specific product knowledge. They simply did not
have a detailed awareness of the particular nature of personal
pensions or, indeed, the main comparable product, the occupa-
tional scheme (which, not being an investment sold by the
financial sector, fell outside the regulatory net).
Secondly, the monitoring process adopted was firm based
and largely incremental. Information on firm's processes was
gathered through the periodic inspection visits, and LAUTRO
would then indicate to the firm what standards it expected it
to conform to (standards which were themselves evolving).
However, inspection visits were a time-consuming process; an
inspection of a major life company would take around six
weeks, and the first cycle of inspection visits took four years.4"
The follow up or verification visit to ensure implementation of
the steps required from the first visit would not usually be for
46 See FIMBRA, GUIDANCE NOTE 7 (June 1992).
" LAUTRO required firms to report in their January 1993 annual return of
any action taken and any on-going action that the results of the survey prompted
members to take. See LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 16, 11 1.16-.17 (June 1992).
4' For reports on the general state of compliance found in those visits, see
LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (Sept. 1990) and the annual reports to the
Monitoring Committee in LAUTRO, ENFORCEMENT BULL. 14 (Feb. 1992); LAUTRO,




another few months or even not until the next PIV. Thus,
gathering an accumulated body of information from those visits
on the state of compliance across firms was a slow process.
Thirdly, the nature of the inspections tended to be very
detailed and looked across the whole range of the firm. They
were largely file based and tended to focus on particular com-
pliance processes-the monitoring of recruitment processes and
fact finds in particular. Monitoring was not focused on par-
ticular products or areas of business. Systematic problems,
particularly those that were product related, could, therefore,
just slip through the net. Fact finds, for example, would be
sampled mainly on a random basis. Unless the official specifi-
cally asked to see one, he or she simply might not have come
across a personal pension fact find, particularly if that was not
a significant part of the company's business.
Finally, attention was diverted elsewhere, principally to
the problems of monitoring ARs. As LAUTRO's chief executive,
Kit Jebens, candidly expressed:
There is little doubt that the large amount of intellectual effort and
human resources that LAUTRO devoted to dealing with the AR
problem diverted its attention from other bad practices, such as the
mis-selling of pensions, which were to have much graver conse-
quences later.49
IV. LESSONS FOR REGULATION
The failure of self-regulation to prevent pension mis-sell-
ing should not be seen as evidence of a need to abandon self-
regulation in the context of privatised Social Security. Before
abandoning this model, one has to consider whether the alter-
native, direct government regulation, would have produced
greater protection. In the context of this scandal, there is little
reason to believe that this would have been the case. The fac-
tors that overwhelmed this regulatory system would have
produced similar failures in government regulation.
The scandal occurred in the context of an industry that
was not used to retail regulation and had little or no experi-
ence as to what this would require. It also took place during a
'9 JEBENS, supra note 22, at 79.
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period in which major structural changes took place in the
distribution of investment products, some of which were the
result of regulation itself.5" With building societies and banks
and large numbers of brokers agreeing to be AR's for insurance
companies, and a simultaneously large expansion in direct
sales, the system of self-regulation by LAUTRO was put under
incredible strain. Much of the mis-selling occurred during the
period before LAUTRO was able to ensure that its members
took proper responsibility for the training and selling practices
of its ARs and direct sales forces.
Any claim that government regulation would have provid-
ed better protection against pension mis-selling has to show
why this would have occurred. There is no reason to believe
that government inspectors who undertook retail regulation for
the first time would have had greater expertise than the SROs'
enforcement officers or the firms' compliance officers. This was
a new system of regulation. Like the SROs' enforcement offi-
cers, government inspectors would have used their early visits
to learn about the industry's practices and identify and
prioritise areas for attention. It is unlikely that government
inspectors would have identified the particular problem of
pension sales earlier, and acted quicker, than LAUTRO,
FIMBRA and SIB.
The lack of resources and the sheer number of firms it had
to supervise undermined FIMBRA's enforcement practices.
This is a problem that remains unsolved. Whilst government
regulation might possibly put greater resources into the regu-
lation of small investment intermediaries, one has to see this
in the context of burden involved. FIMBRA never got very far
beyond the prevention of gross fraud. Ensuring the quality of
sales occupies the other end of the spectrum. Unless govern-
ment is prepared to put enormous resources into providing the
number of inspectors necessary to visit regularly enormous
numbers of small firms, the best protection against mis-sold
private pensions is not government versus self-regulation but
restricting the sales of private pensions to large providers or
those that tie themselves with, and can be regulated by, larger
" Most critically the requirement that an intermediary be either tied to one
product provider or completely independent and able to advise on products of all
providers, the so-called "polarisation" rule.
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firms. LAUTRO's experience with ARs, and recent evidence of
the regulatory failures of large financial intermediaries that
seek to provide compliance services to small firms,5' suggests
that a ban on pension sales by small firms would be the pre-
ferred option.
The perceived failure of self-regulation is linked to that of
general rules. SIB and the SROs failed to spell out what these
rules required in practice, making their detailed implication
the responsibility of the individual firm. In Ayes &
Braithwaites' model of enforced self-regulation, devolving the
responsibility for detailed rule making to firms is expected to
increase the level of protection. Firms are supposed to develop
internal rules, which they impose on their own workforce. For
example, a firm that was suspicious of the effects of commis-
sion on commitment to best advice, might make follow up tele-
phone calls to customers to check whether details were being
properly obtained. They might also develop templates for their
salesmen to identify categories of customers for whom particu-
lar products are unlikely to prove best advice. Whilst such
internal rules have been developed now, they were not in place
during the period of mis-selling.
The pension mis-selling scandal is a warning against opti-
mism in claiming such benefits for enforced self-regulation.
Whilst private firms may complain about the bureaucratic
burden of detailed government rules, they shirk from the re-
sponsibility to "think through" the implications of general
rules. Although the regulators had no specific requirements for
pension sales, the industry felt no need to operate such rules
either. Until the regulators specified what was required in the
way of training, or record keeping, this too remained inade-
quate. The logic of enforced self-regulation is that firms are
required to be pro-active in spotting the implications of general
rules for their own businesses. However, the pension scandal
showed the industry to be largely re-active-waiting for the
regulators to tell them what to do.
" See Networks Reel Again: Financial Adviser's Record Fine Further Damages




Once again, before concluding that government regulation
through detailed rules would have been superior, one has to
consider what would have happened. A government depart-
ment that was responsible for producing regulations for all
aspects of retail investment business within a few years would
not have developed adequate rules for training, supervision
and selling for this whole industry which would have prevent-
ed pension mis-selling. Worse still, from the consumer's point
of view, if government had failed to spot the potential for mis-
selling, it could not have then required the firms to compen-
sate those who suffered thereby. By taking the responsibility
for detailed rule making to itself, government also has respon-
sibility for losses arising from the failure to make those rules.
However, whereas government may make (and in this scandal
has made) firms pick up the compensation bill for their failure
to think through the implications of general rules for pension
sales, we doubt that government will impose such liabilities on
itself. The responsibility to think through the implications of
general rules is a potentially retrospective liability: one is a
hostage to hindsight. Government may impose large retrospec-
tive liabilities on private firms; it is less likely to impose such
liabilities on itself.
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